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MEDICAL EVIDENCE IN WISCONSIN*
SUEL 0. ARNOLD**
At the meeting of the Insurance Section of the American Bar
Association held at San Francisco, September 15 to 17, 1952, Bolitha
J. Laws, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia,1 posed the question whether the judicial systems, as they now
function, meet today's needs. Among other things, Judge Laws said
that one of the greatest menaces facing the courts today is the ever-
increasing number of long drawn-out trials. 2 On this point, Judge
Laws said:
"I do not know whether you of the Insurance Law Section have
had that experience or not, but the lawyers of Washington are
learning to stretch the usual personal injury cases into a week
or ten days. I just do not understand it. When I came to the
bar we used to try such cases in a day or a day and a half. It
is true that at the last meeting I had with an insurance group in
Richmond they told me of $100,000 and $200,000 verdicts they
getting against you lawyers. Maybe that is the way to do it, but
it seems to me that the personal injury case should not require
ten days, or fifteen days, to try."3
There was a personal injury case in the Circuit Court in Milwaukee
County which, I believe, consumed thirty days of actual trial. It has
become customary to have personal injury cases in the Circuit Courts
drag from ten days to three weeks. Judge Laws is right when he
says that we must find a remedy to shorten the trials.
The major portion of trial work today involves personal injuries.
In the majority of these cases, the nature and extent of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff require expert medical testimony, which,
in many cases, is sharply contradictory. Hence, it is not surprising to
* An address delivered before the board of Circuit Judges of Wisconsin, Jan. 6,
1956.
** Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin, 1924-30; Member of firm of Dougherty,
Arnold and Philipp; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Member of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin Bar Association.
'American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, 1952 proceedings, page
16.
2 Id., page 18.
3 Id., page 18.
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see interest in medico-legal cases reflected in an increasing number of
publications.
4
The frequency of the introduction of medical evidence has led
many of us to forget the basic principles of admissibility and non-
admissibility. Justice Holmes with his usual facility of language best
expressed the situation when he said in his dissenting opinion in
Hyde v. U.S. :'
"It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become
encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to
provoke further analysis."
Judge Parnell, in a letter which he wrote me after I had consented
to present this paper, stated that he had suggested the topic. He said
that what he particularly had in mind and what he wished I would
bear in mind was a manuscript that would be readily available to
judges as cases are being tried. He explained that he had in mind
the statutes that might be pertinent, the cases that pass on hypo-
thetical questions, privileges, waiver of privileges, admission of hos-
pital records, and inspection, and any phase of the subject of medical
evidence which might come up on motions before trial and during the
course of the trial. Judge Parnell said that he hoped the paper would
be complete and would serve as a ready reference to the judge sitting
on the bench during the course of the trial.
It is my hope to satisfy some of Judge Parnell's requirements. At
any rate, his suggestions constituted a warning that the paper should be
objective, and should not be either subjective or abstract. I shall,
therefore, attempt to be specific and to present a paper which will
answer practical everyday problems encountered by the Circuit Judges
in the trial of personal injury actions.
4 (a) Expert Medical Opinion Evidence with Reference to Automobile Damage
Cases by Oscar T. Toebaas; PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE
LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N. 1957, p. 1,30.
(b) Medical Evidence, BULLETIN WISCONSIN BAR ASS'N. Vol. 23, No. 3,
August, 1950, by D. V. W. Beckwith.
(c) X-Ray Examination, BULLETIN WISCONSIN BAR ASS'N. Vol. 28, No. 2,
April, 1955, by Dr. Hans W. Hefke.
(d) Report of the Annual Meeting of the American College of Trial Lawyers
at Las Vegas, Nevada on April 4, 1955: THE Low LUMBAR INTERVERTEBRAL
Disc, by Louise J. Gordy, M.D., and THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF
THE HUMAN HEART with an Introduction to Its Pathological Physiology
by Leo Gelfand, M.D.
(e) AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, 1954 proceedings; THE
ANATOMY, FUNCTION AND PATHOLOGY OF THE INTERVERTEBRAL Disc by
Edward L. Compere, p. 87, and THE NEUROLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HERNIATED
INTERVERTEBRAL Discs by Paul C. Bucy, M.D., p. 101.
(f) FEDERATION INSURANCE COUNSEL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, p. 67; THE IN-
SURANCE COMPANY AND ITS DOCTOR, by Frederick D. Lewis, which con-
tains an excellent bibliography.
(g) INSURANCE COUNSEL JOURNAL, Volume XXII, p. 126; THE VALUE OF THE
LAW-SCIENCE SHORT COURSES TO INSURANCE COUNSEL IN THE TRIAL Or
PERSONAL INJURY CASES by Herbert Winston-Smith, LL.B., M.D.




WHO MAY TESTIFY AS A MEDICAL EXPERT
Section 147.14(1) of the Statutes, as amended in 1953, enumerates
the persons who shall practice and hold themselves out as authorized
to practice medicine, surgery, and osteopathy. Not only has the
Legislature expressly provided that no person may treat the sick
unless he has been licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners,
but no person without such a license shall have the right to testify
in a professional capacity on a subject relating to medical treatment
as a medical or osteopathic physician or practitioner unless he possesses
such license. The Legislature has provided an exception that a medical
or osteopathic physician licensed to practice in another state may
testify as the attending or examining physician or surgeon to the care,
treatment, examination, or condition of sick or injured persons whom
he has treated in the ordinary course of his professional practice for
the sickness or injury which is the subject of the judicial inquiry in
any action or proceeding in which he is called as a witness.6 Although
the statute is not entirely clear, it is probable that only the non-resident
physician who has treated the patient may testify. In other words, an
expert who had not treated the patient probably could not testify.
Judge Tehan has for some time followed the rule in his branch
of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin of permitting a non-resident doctor to testify in a
personal injury case in his court. He does not impose any restrictions
such as consultation with a Wisconsin physician or treatment of a
Wisconsin resident.
Section 147.19 of the Statutes creates an exception to Sections
147.14 and 147.18 of the WISCONSIN STATUTES. These sections do
not apply to medical or osteopathic physicians of other states or coun-
tries in actual consultation with resident licensed practitioners of this
state. Under Section 147.19, a physician licensed in a sister state or in
a foreign country who was in consultation with a Wisconsin physician
concerning the treatment of a patient may testify in a personal injury
action involving such patient. The Statute was applied literally in
Landrath v. Allstate Insurance Co.7 In that case, a Wisconsin physi-
cian consulted with a Minnesota physician respecting the treatment of
a patient. The court held that the Minnesota physician was competent
to testify under subsection (1) of Section 147.19 of the Statutes.
Under the statute as it stood before it was amended by Chapters
342 and 459 of the Laws of 1953, a non-resident practitioner in
medicine, surgery or osteopathy, licensed in another state might testify
';WIs. STAT. (1953) §147.14(2) (a).
7259 Wis. 248 (1951).
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as an expert in this state when the testimony was necessary to estab-
lish the rights of citizens or residents of this state in a judicial pro-
ceeding and expert testimony of licensed practitioners of this state
sufficient for the purpose were not available. In Morrill v. Korna-
sinski,8 the court held that a Michigan osteopath and surgeon, not
licensed to practice in Wisconsin, might qualify as an expert in an
action by a Wisconsin resident against Wisconsin doctors for mal-
practice in the diagnosis and treatment of a fracture of the humerus
where the plaintiff had consulted such osteopath for the purpose of
determining what course of treatment to follow and where it appeared
that the plaintiff was unable to obtain a licensed practitioner of medi-
cine and surgery in Wisconsin to testify.
The question may arise under the Statute with respect to the testi-
mony of a non-resident medical expert in a case involving an accident
which occurred before the amendment of the Statute in 1953. Since
the qualification of the non-resident expert to testify involves a matter
of procedure, it is my opinion that a non-resident medical expert can
testify under the statute as it now stands and that the restrictions con-
tained in the 1951 statute no longer apply.
Subsection (2) (b) contains a provision which can be troublesome.
That section provides that the court may permit any person to testify
as an expert on a medical subject in any action or judicial proceeding
where proof is offered satisfactory to the courts that such person is
qualified as an expert. This statute applies to a medical technician
such as is found in hospitals and even in private laboratories. Such a
technician is described in 39 O.A.G. 10. There the Secretary of State
Board of Medical Examiners inquired of the Attorney General
whether a graduate medical technologist in Milwaukee, who conducted
her own laboratory but who also was not a person licensed to practice
medicine, surgery or osteopathy, was practicing medicine within the
meaning of Sections 147.14 and 147.02. The technician who was a
graduate technologist made the following tests in her laboratory with-
out supervision: Platelet count, bleeding and coagulation times, clot
retraction, prothrombin time, sedimentation rate, hematocrit reading,
urinalysis (including color, transparency, specific gravity, reaction-
acid or alkaline, albumen, sugar and microscopic examination for blood
cells and casts), basal metabolism, gastric analysis (including titrations
for free and total acid, blood and bile tests, and lactic acid), blood
sugar, glucose tolerance test, blood P.N., serum cholesterol, blood
typing (for Landsteimer groups), RH typing, anti-RH titre, aggluti-
tion tests (Widal type), and heterophile antibody test. The sole
function performed by the technologist was to conduct such tests and
8256 Wis. 417 (1949).
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to furnish reports to physicians. She did not attempt to diagnose or
treat any injuries or disease of any patient; she made the tests on the
patients who were sent to her by physicians and transmitted the reports
to the physicians. The Attorney General held that she was not practi-
cing medicine and hence did not require a license or certificate from
the State Board of Medical Examiners.
The technician referred to in the opinion of the Attorney General
would be a person who was an expert on a medical subject and since
it appeared that physicians relied upon her reports in treating patients,
the court undoubtedly would permit her to testify. It would seem that
roentgenological and bacteriological experts could also testify under
the statute where the court was satisfied that they possessed the neces-
sary qualifications. On the other hand, we may readily conjure a
number of cases where the trial court would not permit an alleged
expert to testify. For example, in a case recently tried before one
of the Federal Judges, the plaintiff called a psychologist as a witness
to testify to the results of the Rorschach test. The court pointed out
that he could see no relevancy of such testimony and the offer was
refused. I have heard, however, that at least one Circuit Judge in Mil-
waukee County permitted the psychologist to testify as a medical
expert. Since a psychologist is not licensed to practice medicine and
since no sanctions may be imposed because of the testimony given,
it would appear to be dangerous to permit such testimony except
perhaps in a very restricted field. Such testimony, at least at the
present time, would very likely be in the same category as the testi-
mony relating to the results of a lie detector test. Such evidence has
not yet been permitted in Wisconsin.
In Wisconsin, the courts have been extremely liberal in permitting
expert testimony by physicians who admittedly are not experts in the
specialized field of medicine concerning which they are testifying.
For example, the court in Dabareiner v Weisflog,9 upheld a verdict
based upon the testimony of a doctor who, on cross-examination,
testified that there were seven lumbar vertebrae, whereas it is a matter
of common knowledge that there are only five lumbar vertebrae. In
Paepcke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'0 the court held that an orthopedic
surgeon could testify to personality changes. The qualifications of a
surgeon to testify as an expert were discussed in the early case of
Lowe v. State," and Plainse v. Engle.1 2
There is one limitation imposed upon the qualification of a physi-
cian to testify as a medical expert. In Zoldoske v. State,13 the court
9 253 Wis. 23, 27 (1948).
10 263 Wis. 290 (1953).
111j8 Wis. 641, 653 (1903).
32 262 Wis. 506, 514 (1952).
13 82 Wis. 580, 605 (18Q2)
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held that a medical witness who has had no experience with the par-
ticular subject concerning which he is testifying and whose knowledge
is derived entirely from reading scientific or medical books, is not
qualified to express an expert medical opinion. The same rule was
followed in Kath v. Wisconsin Central Railway Co., '1 and in Zielsdorf
v. Grotsky."
There are two procedural matters which must not be overlooked
in dealing with expert testimony. Suppose an expert refuses to appear
in court at the request of a party. This situation occurs in some cases
where the party calling the witness either refuses to pay the fee de-
manded for testimony or refuses to furnish security for payment
satisfactory to the physicians. In Wisconsin, the rule is firmly estab-
lished that an expert witness may be compelled to appear in court
and testify pursuant to a subpoena to the same extent as a lay witness.
Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. of City of New
York ;16 Philler v. Waukesha County.17
If a party desires to call a non-resident physician as a witness, he
must serve a written notice on the adverse party five days in advance
of the date on which the witness will be called, stating the name of the
witness, his residence, and business address. For good cause shown, the
trial court may shorten the notice to three days.'
II
UPON WHAT SUBJECTS MAY A MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESS TESTIFY
The theory which permits the court to admit the testimony of
experts is predicated upon the assumption that in order to reach a
proper conclusion on scientific matters, the scientist must explain the
technicalities of such matters. It follows, therefore, that a medical
expert cannot testify as an expert except upon matters which require
expert testimony. In an early Wisconsin case,' 9 a doctor testified
as a medical expert. He had taken hair from the decendent's head
and compared it with hair found on a wheelbarrow owned by the de-
fendant and found on the defendant's premises after the death of the
decedent. The doctor testified that as a result of the comparison of
the hair, he concluded that it was from the head of the deceased. He
did not base his conclusion upon any scientific test, but simply from
the length, magnitude and color of the hair. The court held that such
a comparison required no particular skill or scientific knowledge and
held that the evidence was not admissible, first, because the evidence
14 121 Wis. 503, 513 (1904).
15 195 Wis. 253, 258 (1928).
1G 7 F.R.D. 548 (Dis.Ct., E.D. Wis.).
"7 139 Wis. 211, 131 Am. St. Rep. 1055, 17 Ann. Cas. 712 (1909).
18 WIS. STAT. (1953) §147.14(2) (c).
"9 Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 249 (1882).
[Vol. 39
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
did not relate to a scientific subject and secondly, because the testi-
mony invaded the province of the jury.
In Casson v. Schoenfeld,2 0 hypothetical questions were put to two
doctors, asking whether in their judgment persons of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence should have known that a person named Brickman
did not have sufficient mental ability to know what he was doiig. The
court held that this was not such a form of question as called for
expert testimony because it permitted the witness to do just what the
jury was expected and required to do. The court cited the following
cases in support of its decision. Knoll v. State,21 Lomoe v. Superior
W., L. & P. Co.,22 Mellor v. Utica,23 and McKone v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co.24
Anderson v. Eggert,25 is the leading case on the subject. There,
two physicists who were professors in the Department of Physics at
the University of Wisconsin, testified about what would happen under
different states of facts in the collision of automobiles. They did not,
however, undertake to say where the collision took place. The court
held, page 359, -that whether in a particular case the opinion of a wit-
ness should be received is matter which rests very largely within the
'discretion of the trial court. It was contended that an expert witness
could not testify to matters which the jury might be called upon to
determine. The court at page 360, however, held that so long as the
opinion of the expert was warranted by the evidence and was kept
within the field of scientific knowledge, the evidence was not object-
ionable because the effect of the answer was to pass upon some ulti-
mate question for solution. That was also the decision of the court
in Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilson Co.26 There the
court held that the opinions of experts were admissible, even though
they related to one of the ultimate facts to be passed on by the jury.
These cases mirror the general trend of appellate decisions to
permit the trial court to determine in the exercise of sound discretion
whether there is need for expert testimony in a particular case.
Attempts sometimes are made to have the medical expert testify to
an opinion based on his opinion as to what happened at the time of the
accident. It has long been well settled that the court will not sustain
a finding based upon the opinion of an expert which is predicated in
part upon the opinion of the expert as to what happened at the time
20 166 Wis. 401, 415 (1918).
21Suigpra, note 19.
22 147 Wis. 5. 11 (1911).
2: 48 Wis. 457 (1879).
24 131 Wis. 243, 253 (1907).
2 234 Wis. 348, 359-361 (1940).
26 207 Wis. 209, 229 (1932).
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of the accident. The leading case on this subject is Bucher v. Wis--
consin Central Railway Co.,27 where the court stated:
"The verdict of a jury founded upon facts is entitled to great
weight, and is almost conclusive upon this court if supported by
any evidence. But the verdict of a jury founded only upon the
opinion of experts concerning the cause of a condition, which
condition is itself established by the opinion of experts, has no
such weight . . . . So that obvious error of opinion, opinion
based on insufficient data, or nonsense clothed in words of
'learned length,' may be disregarded by this court as a basis for
supporting a verdict. ' 28
The Bucher case has been followed in a number of later decisions.
In McGaw v. Wassmann,29 the physician testified that his conclusion
as to the condition of the plaintiff was based upon the physician's
opinion as to what happened at the time of the accident. The doctor
testified that in his opinion, the accident caused a severe blow to the
plaintiff's head, but there was no evidence in the record to show that
there was any such blow. The court held that the conclusion of the
physician was as speculative as his conclusion as to what happened at
the time of the accident. The court therefore held that the opinion
could not support a verdict.
In Vogelsburg v. Mason & Hanger Co.,30 the court held that since
there was no direct evidence that there was any thrombosis or rupture
or hemorrhage as a result of the accident, a medical opinion based
upon the fact that there was a thrombosis, or rupture, or hemorrhage
could not support a verdict. The court cited with approval Bucher v.
Wisconsin Central Railway Co.,3s and the later case of Dreher v.
United Commercial Travelers.32 In that case, the court held that the
the basis of the conclusion of the medical expert could not be deduced
or inferred from the conclusion itself, that is, the opinion of the expert
did not constitute proof of the existence of the facts necessary to
support the opinion.
The latest case on the subject which I have found is Hicks v.
New Yorks Fire Insurance Company.3 In that case, the opinion of a
heating engineer was based upon his unwarranted assumption that
certain facts existed. The court held, page 189, that his testimony
did not support the verdict.
27 139 Wis. 597, 606 (1909).
28 at 606-608.
29263 Wis. 486 (1953).
30250 Wis. 242 (1947).
31 Supra, note 27.
32 173 Wis. 173, 178 (1921).




To WHAT EXTENT MAY A MEDICAL WITNESS TESTIFY
TO THE HISTORY GIVEN HIM AND TO
SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS
The most vexing problem-and one which arises in every personal
injury case where a medical expert testifies-relates to the admission
of testimony of a physician concerning the history of the case and the
subjective symptoms of the injured person. Questions involving history
arise through the testimony of attending physicians and physicians who
qualify solely as witnesses at the trial. The question of the admissi-
bility of evidence relating to subjective symptoms arise with respect to
the treating physician after he knows that a lawsuit is contemplated
or has been instituted and with respect to the physician who qualifies
as an expert witness.
Trial courts can avert a great deal of the difficulty by distinguishing
between facts related by a physician which constitute affirmative or
substantive evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, and facts
which the physician takes into consideration in arriving at his con-
clusion. I appreciate that the courts in Wisconsin have not observed
the distinction except as to one facet of the problem.
An excellent statement of the distinction appears in the concurring
opinion by Justice Rossman in Reid v. Yellow Cab Company,3 4 where
it is said:
"The prevailing opinion fails to recognize the distinction be-
tween receiving in evidence the communications of a patient to
his physician as proof of the truth of the matter stated, and ad-
mitting them for the purpose of showing the basis of the physi-
cians judgment. When received for the purpose first mentioned,
the communications as repeated by the physician-witness, be-
come evidence in support of the contention of the party; while
in the second instance they go before the jury merely to show
upon what information the medical man based his opinion."
The same distinction was drawn in Kraettli v. North Coast Trans-
portation Co. 3 5
In Wisconsin, the general rule is that a physician who treats a
patient may testify to the statements made by the patient in the form
of a history which are necessary in order that the doctor may make a
proper diagnosis and prescribe the neLessary treatment. Such testi-
mony constitutes affirmative evidence in the c3se. 6
34 131 Ore. 27, 279 Pac. 635, 67 A.L.R. 1, 5 (1929).
a1 166 Wash. 86, 6 P.2d 609, 80 A.L.R. 1520 (1932).
36 Bridge v. Oshkosh, 67 Wis. 195, 197 (1886) ; Kreuziger v. C.&N.W.R. Co., 73
Wis. 158 (1888) ; Stewart v. Everts, 76 Wis. 35 (1890) ; Abbot v. Heath, 84
Wis. 314, 319 (1893); Stone v. C.St.P.M.&Or. R. Co., 88 Wis. 98 (1894);
Curran v. A. H. Strange Co., 98 Wis. 598 (1898).
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What constitutes facts necessary to diagnose a case and to equip
the physician to render adequate treatment? The best way to enunci-
ate the rule is by the process of exclusion rather than inclusion. Thus,
a narrative by the patient of the manner in which the accident hap-
pened is not necessary for diagnosis or treatment, is hearsay, and
therefore inadmissible. In 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3d Ed., Section
1722, pages 74-75, the great Master of evidence states:
"a. Statements of external circumstances causing the injury,
namely, the events leading up to it, the immediate occasion of
it (e.g. that the person was knocked down by a horse), or the
nature of the injury (e.g. that a leg was broken), do not satisfy
the necessity principle, because they do not relate to an internal
state, and thus other evidence is presumably available; more-
over they have not the usual condition of trustworthiness, be-
cause they are not naturally called forth by the present pain
or suffering (though this latter reason is rarely noticed)."
In the leading case on the subject in Wisconsin, Maine v. Mary-
land C. Co., 3 7 the trial court refused to permit attending physicians
to testify that some days after the accident, the injured party stated
that he had injured himself by the moving of an icebox. The Supreme
Court held that such declarations were clearly no part of the res
gestae, were hearsay and inadmissible.
In this case, the court put statements made to an attending physi-
cian as to the cause of an injury in the same category as corresponding
statements made to a lay witness and therefore Inadmissible.3 8 The
Maine case was cited with approval and followed in Shepard v. United
States.39
The question arose in Kraut v. State,40 which was a criminal action
brought against a physician for an abortion, whether statements made
by the deceased, upon whom the abortion was performed, could be
proved by tw9 attending physicians. These physicians testified over
objection that the deceased stated she had great pain in the lower part
of the abdomen and that she thought she had appendicitis; that she
had known that she was pregnant and that she had an operation per-
formed for the production of an abortion. The name of the defendant
was not disclosed in connection with the testimony of either doctor.
Both doctors testified that it was, necessary for them to have the in-
formation contained in the statements of the deceased in order properly
37 172 Wis. 350 (1920).
3.8 Andrews v. U.S. Casualty Co., 154 Wis. "82, 86 (1913) ; Brahmsteadt v. Mystic
Workers of the World, 152 Wis. 580, 582 (1913) ; Hall v. The American Ma-
sonic Accident Association, 86 Wis. 518, 525 (1893) ; McKeigue v. Janesville,
68 Wis. 50, 57 (1887).
39290 U.S. 96, 105 (1933).
40 228 Wis. 386 (1938).
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to diagnose and treat the case. The court held the statements to be
admissible as affirmative evidence.
In all civil cases, excepting those where the injured party has died,
is insane, or incapacitated to testify or is a minor of tender years, the
trial court can prevent a question from arising with respect to affirma-
tive testimony on the part of the attending physician. The court can
require, as many judges do, that before any medical testimony is intro-
duced, the plaintiff must testify in chief, both as to direct examination,
cross examination, and redirect examination. The plaintiff therefore
can testify in detail concerning all matters relating to the history. The
effect of the doctor's testimony therefore can only be cumulative, and
upon that basis alone, the trial court can prevent the physician from
transgressing the rule against narrative hearsay. Even if the trial
court does show extreme liberty in permitting the physician to testify
as to the history, the court will not commit reversible error. In Mader
v. Boehm," a physician who was not an attending physician testified
to the history given him by the plaintiff. The court held that although
the admission of the evidence constituted error, since the plaintiff had
testified to the matters referred to in the history recited by the physi-
cian, the error was not prejudicial. The interdiction against narrative
history, testified to by a physician, was observed in Scott v. lames
Gibbons Co.," and Green v. City of Cleveland.43 In the Green case,
the history recited that the plaintiff fell off a streetcar and caught her
heel. The court held that the statement was not admissible for any
purpose and was not admissible against the patient because it was not
a statement made incidental to treatment.
These cases are in line with the almost universal rule that state-
ments made by an injured party to his attending physician as to the
cause of the injury and the circumstances attending the accident,
which are not a part of the res gestae, are inadmissible in evidence.
4
4
Where a physician makes an examination for the purpose of treat-
ment and also testifying, he cannot testify either to a history or sub-
jective symptoms. The rule applies where the injured party contem-
plates suit but has not actually brought suit. The statements made by
the injured party are considered as post litem motain and are not
admissible. Kath v. Wisconsin Central Railway Co.
45
As a corollary to this rule, it follows that where the physician
makes the examination of the patient solely for the purpose of qualify-
ing as an expert, he cannot testify either to a history or to subjective
41213 Wis. 55 (1933).
42 192 Md. 319, 64 A.2d 117 (1949).
43 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63 (1948).44 Anno. 67 A.L.R. 10, 25-26.
45 121 Wis. 503 (1904).
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symptoms. Kath v. Wisconsin Central Railway Co.,4" Schields v.
Fredrick.4 7
It is particularly annoying to a physician who testifies as an expert,
after having examined an injured party, to be met with the objection
that he cannot testify to subjective symptoms. The party calling the
expert may avoid the difficulty by having the doctor testify first as to
the information which he had at the time of the examination. Medical
witnesses are not directed to make an examination blindly. In the
majority of cases where a' medical expert is called to testify, either
the plaintiff's attending physician, or lawyer, or the defendant's claims
representative, or attorney, tells the doctor why he is to make the
examination. The doctor therefore knows before he undertakes the
examination that, for example, the plaintiff was a truck driver who
was involved in a collision with an automobile; that he was thrown
from his truck to the pavement and was unconscious for a period of
time; that he sustained a fracture of one of his legs and that he had
a crushing injury to his chest and a severe head injury; that when
he left the hospital he had a cast on his leg; that he had difficulty in
obtaining a union of the bones; that he complained of headaches and
dizziness and nausea upon arising in the morning; that at the time
of the examination, which was a year after the accident, the injured
party continued to make the same complaints, and that the injured
party claims that his condition is becoming worse. Surely the doctor
should be permitted to testify to the knowledge he had at the time of
the examination, if for no other reason than to support his conclu-
sion . 4  The doctor can also be permitted to testify to a conclusion
based upon a hypothetical question that assumes the truth of every
item testified to by a physician as subjective symptoms. Why then
should the doctor be prevented from testifying to the subjective
symptoms? The whole difficulty can be eliminated just as it was in
Kraettli v. North Coast Transportation Co.,49 where the court per-
mitted the doctor to testify what the paient told him, although he
examined the patient solely for the purpose of testifying. The court
admitted such testimony, however, solely for the purpose of indicating
the basis of the expert's opinion and not upon the basis of affirmative
evidence.
The case sets forth a comprehensive form of instruction to the
jury, advising them that what the doctor testified to was not affirmative
evidence but constituted simply facts upon which the physician predi-
cated his professional opinion.
46 Ibid.
47232 Wis. 595 (1939).48 Anno. 67 A.L.R. 18, 80 A.L.R. 1528, 130 A.L.R. 979.
49 Supra, note 35.
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There are, of course, cases where the history must be given to the
attending physician by third parties. Typical examples are those
where an infant has been injured and the parent, a witness, or an
officer gives a history to an attending physician. Another typical case
is where an injured party is rendered unconscious because of the acci-
dent and some third party gives the history to the physician. In such
cases, the physician may testify to such statements to the same extent
as he could if the patient had recited the history. That was the situa-
tion in Leora v. M.St.P.& S.S.M.R. Co.50 There, the physician who
treated the plaintiff testified that his diagnosis of a fracture at the
base of the brain was based partly upon an examination of the injured
party, and partly upon a history of the accident as related to him by
some person. The trial court permitted the introduction of the testi-
mony over objection. The court said, page 395:
".... The objection is made that Dr. Urquhart should not have
been allowed to state that in his opinion there was a fracture
at the base of the brain because that diagnosis was based in part
upon a history of the accident told him by some person, and that
there is no proof that such history was truthful.
"The objection seems to us unsubstantial. Here was a youth
unconscious, delirious, suffering from severe injuries, lacera-
tions and contusions of the face, showing beyond question that
he had fallen or been thrown on his face with violence. No
credible history of the accident could have been much more or
less than this. It is not claimed or suggested that the history
given to the doctor was in any respect erroneous, and it would
have been very easy to find out by a single question what the
history was. Were it a case where the diagnosis must neces-
sarily be founded on symptoms extending over a series of years
or even months the objection would be more substantial ..."
See also U.S. v. Katz,51 National Bank of Commerce v. City of New
Bedford.5 2
Where there were no compelling circumstances, the court in an
earlier case held that an expert could not base his opinion on what
third parties told him. Kreuziger v. C.&N.W.R. Co.
53
IV
IN WHAT FORm MAY QUESTIONS BE PUT TO A
MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESS
Ordinarily, the medical expert must express his opinion in response
to a hypothetical question. Such response need not be based wholly
upon a hypothetical question and in some cases, counsel need not
50 156 Wis. 386, 8 N.C.C.A. 108 (1914).
51213 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1954).
52 175 Mass. 257, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900).
5373 Wis. 158 (1888).
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put a hypothetical question to the witness. It has been held in a num-
ber of cases that where the facts are undisputed, and the medical
witness is in the courtroom during the trial, the medical witness may
express an opinion without being asked a hypothetical question.
This, in Cornell v. State,5 4 the court said, page 537:
"From a careful comparison of the decisions of this court, the
following rule may be formulated: Where the evidence given
is not conflicting, and not so complicated or voluminous as to
make a difference of understanding of material facts probable,
an expert witness who has heard it all may be asked to predicate
his opinion thereon, on the assumption of its truth, without
rehearsing it in a hypothetical question; and that, unless such
conditions exist, a question should be put, embodying the facts
on which he is asked to base his opinion."
In Tendrup v. State,55 two doctors heard most of the defendant's
testimony, and that which they did not hear was read to them. The
doctors were asked whether in their opinion the defendant was sane
or insane at the time of the killing for which he was being tried.
They based their opinion on the testimony of the defendant. The
court held that an expert witness could base his opinion upon un-
contradicted evidence which he has heard in court. To the same effect,
Duthey v. State.56
The procedure to be followed in asking the hypothetical question
is outlined in the two leading cases of Kieckhoefer v. Hidershide,5f
and Balthazor v. State.58 Chief Justice Rosenberry there made the
following statement:
"In Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N.W. 112, it was held error
to permit an expert to answer this question: 'What, in your
opinion would all the facts as sworn to by the several witnesses,
if true, indicate as to the mental condition of the prisoner at the
time of the commission of the offense?' This was held erro-
neous because the evidence was voluminous, not entirely harmo-
nious, and to some extent contradictory.
"The question here propounded did not ask the witness to
assume the truth of the testimony on the part of the State or
the truth of the testimony given on the part of the defendant,
but to base his opinion upon all of the evidence offered and
received in the case. It is impossible for the jury to know upon
what facts the expert bases his opinion when the expert is ex-
amined in this way. It is hardly necessary to point out that
where there are conflicting theories in a case and evidence to
support each theory, counsel in propounding a hypothetical
question to an expert may select any hypothesis fairly supported
54 104 Wis. 527, 535 (1899).
55 193 Wis. 482, 485 (1927).
56 131 Wis. 178, 188 (1907). See Also: Anno. 82 A.L.R. 1460.
57 113 Wis. 280 (1902).
58207 Wis. 172, at p. 191 (1932).
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by the evidence and call for the'conclusion of the expert. witness
upon the basis of the facts stated in the hypothetical question.
Kiekhoefer v. Hidershide, 113 Wis. 280, 89 N.W. 189. In that
way the various theories in the case may be submitted to ex-
perts and their opinions had thereon because it is then left to
the jury to decide what facts are established by the evidence
and the jurors have the benefit of the expert's opinion upon the
various theories of the case. Where the evidence given is not
conflicting and is not so complicated or voluminous as to make
a difference of understanding of material facts probable, an
expert witness, who has heard it all, may be asked to predicate
his opinion thereon, assuming it to be true. Where these circum-
stances are not present the facts should be embodied in a
hypothetical question. Whether in a given case the testimony
is such as to render a hypothetical question necessary is a
matter which rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial
court. Cornell v. State, 104 Wis. 527, 80 N.W. 745. For a dis-
cussion of this matter and citation of authorities, see 1 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE, (2d ed.), Sections 681, 682, and 683. See, also,
note 39 L.R.A. 305."
It is the duty of counsel to point out where a hypothetical question
is improper. Cornell v. State 5 9
On cross-examination, an expert witness may be interrogated as
to his opinion based upon a hypothetical question which does not
include all of the facts. The hypothetical question, however, must
include undisputed facts. Estate of Scherrer.60 Such question must
also include all the facts necessary to be considered in arriving at a
correct answer.6'
'On cross-examination, the medical expert cannot be questioned
on a hypothesis having no foundation in the facts. He may be cross-
examined on facts which the cross-examiner claims he has proved,
provided such examination is confined within the possible or probable
range of the facts. Zoedoske v. State.6 2
The general rule is that medical and scientific textbooks are not
admissible in evidence, either independently or in connection with the
testimony of an expert.63
Upon cross-examination, counsel may not introduce in evidence
the contents of medical textbooks by reading excerpts to the witness
or by asking whether the witness is familiar with statements made by
certain authors. Bell v. Milwaukee E.R.&L. Co. 64 In certain circum-
stances, an expert witness may be impeached by the use of textbooks.
59 Supra, note 54.
cO242 Wis. 211 (1943).
61 Ibid. at 223.
62 82 Wis. 580, 607 (1892).63 Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 229 (1932);
Bell v. Milwaukee E.R.&L.Co., 169 Wis. 408 (1919): Knoll v. State, 55 Wis.
249, 255 (1882) ; Zoedoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580 (1892).
64 169 Wis. 408 (1919).
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For example, in Bruins v. Brandon Canning Co.,65 a medical expert
testified that he knew of no authority which held that a sudden
trauma might be followed by the development of a malignant growth.
Counsel was permitted to impeach the expert by reading a short
extract from a textbook showing that a reputable authority had made
the statement that a sudden trauma might be followed by the de-
velopment of a malignant growth. To the same effect: Waterman v.
The Chicago & Alton R. Co.,66 Ruck v. Milwaukee Brewery Co. 6 7
So also may a medical expert be cross-examined concerning state-
ments in medical texts where the physician testifies that his opinion
is based partially upon textbooks which he has read.
The court will not take judicial notice of the contents of medical
texts. In Morrill v. Komasinski,68 the appellants upon appeal asked
Ihe Supreme Court to take judicial notice of medical textbooks. The
texts were not offered in evidence at the time of the trial and the
court therefore held that they were not before the court on the appeal.
It is perhaps unnecessary to call attention to the fact that an expert
witness cannot be asked his opinion of the entire case. Maitland v.
The Gilbert Paper Co.6 9
V
To WHAT DEGREE OF DEFINITENESS MUST THE TESTIMONY OF A
MEDICAL WITNESS CONFORM IN ORDER TO BE ADMISSIBLE
Many of the courts have required medical experts to testify to a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty and will not permit the use of any
other words. The cases in Wisconsin do not require a slavish adherence
to the formula "to a reasonable medical certainty." The courts have
repeatedly permitted the introduction of medical testimony where the
doctor testified to a reasonable probability or that a condition was
"likely" or "apt" to follow.
One of the earlier leading cases is Hallum v. Omro,70 which was
decided in 1904. In that case, the court held, page 342, that there could
be no recovery for permanent physical disability in the absence of
competent evidence warranting a conclusion "with reasonable cer-
tainty" that the physical condition complained of will exist as a result
of the accident; "but it is not necessary that opinion evidence should
be confined to that high degree of certainty. Experts may properly
testify to the mere probabilities of the case." The court cited Block
v. Milwaukee S.T.R. Co.,71 where a physician was permitted to give
, 216 Wis. 387, 403 (1934).6682 Wis. 613, 629 (1892).
G7 144 \.'is. 404, 410 (1911).
"s256 Wis. 417 (1949).
":97 Wis. 476, 484 (1897).
71 122 Wis. 337 (1904).
-, 89 Wis. 371 (1895).
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his opinion of the "reasonable probabilities of the plaintiff's ultimate
recovery from his injuries." The court concluded, page 344, that an
examination of the cases showed that "probable," "likely," and "liable"
had been treated as synonymous and that each dealt with reasonable
probability and not with a possibility, and that what may probably
or is likely to be the future result of a personal injury is competent
evidence to prove what is reasonably certain in the matter.
In the leading case of Sundquist v. Madison Railways Co.,7 2 in an
opinion written by Judge Stevens, one of the great trial and Supreme
Court judges, the court said:
"In order that his testimony may be admissible it is not neces-
sary, often not possible, for a physician to state positively that
disability followed directly from a given injury. A jury's find-
ing of reasonable certainty may be based on testimony that such
a result may 'probably' follow or is 'likely,' 'liable,' or 'apt' to
follow the accidental injury. Hallum v. Omro, 122 Wis. 337,
342, 344, 345, 99 N.W. 1051; Faber v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 124
Wis. 554, 561, 102 N.W. 1049; Block v. Milwaukee St. R. Co.,
89 Wis. 371, 375, 61 N.W. 1101." 7
3
In his dissenting opinion in Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v.
Industrial Commission,74 justice Currie deals at length with the deci-
sion in Hallum v. Omro7 5 and states that it has been cited in many
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court as setting forth the proper
criteria for expert medical testimony.
Faber v. C. Reiss Coal Co.,76 was a case where the court approved
questions put to a physician to ascertain whether or not the injuries
to the skull were likely to result in current troubles or were apt to
affect injuriously the other eye. The court predicated its findings upon
the basis that the questions were framed to elicit the probabilities
of futv,e suffering as consequences of existing conditions and was
therefore properly admitted in evidence.
In Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission,7 7 and Haf eman v.
Seymer,7 the court held that a finding to a reasonable certainty may
be based upon evidence which shows only a preponderance of prob-
ability. The court reached the same decision in Pfister & Vogel L. Co.
v. Industrial Commission,7 9 where the physicians testified that it was
more probable that a disease was contracted in a tannery than any-
where else.
72197 Wis. 83, 86 (1928).
73 See comment on this case in Anno. 135 A.L.R. 516, 529.
74263 Wis. 538, 550 (1952).
7 Supra, note 70.
56 124 Wis. 554, 561 (1905).
-7 192 Wis. 362, 365 (1927).
78195 Wis. 625 (1928).
79 194 Wis. 131, 133 (1927).
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In Ramsey v. Biemert,8 ° where Justice Wickhem wrote the opinion
of the court, the experts testified that an accident on a certain date
might have been the exciting cause of the plaintiff's injuries and
further testified that the probabilities were that the accident in suit
was responsible. Upon the authority of Hallum v. Omro,81 it was held
that experts may properly testify to the mere probabilities of the case,
and upon the authority of Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission,"
the court held that a finding may rest upon a preponderance of prob-
abilities. To the same effect: Bruins v. Brandon Canning Co.83
In Gmeiner v. Industrial Commission,84 the Industrial Commission
concluded that the preponderance of probabilities support an inference
that the applicant for compensation was infected with tetanus acquired
while engaged in his employment. The medical testimony was to the
effect that a wound was the most likely place for germs to enter. The
court talked about preponderance of probabilities and stated that
literally it was impossible to have a preponderance of probability. The
court defined the term to mean, page 4, that in a given situation, the
inferences are strong enough to point to a fact as a probability and
not a speculative possibility.
In Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission,"5 the
court distinguished between preponderance of mere possibilities and
preponderance of probabilities. The court stated that mere possibilities
leave the solution of an issue of fact in a field of conjecture and specu-
lation to such an extent as to afford no basis for inferences to a reason-
able certainty. Compare, however, Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial
Commission. 6
In Gerber v. Wlosczynski a7 the court held that an opinion of a
physician that he believed a certain condition to be quite possible was
not opinion evidence based upon a reasonable certainty.
In Vogelsburg v. Mason & Hanger Co,88 the court set aside a
verdict which was based upon testimony which was speculative and
conjectural and was not competent or sufficient to establish a medical
fact to a reasonable certainty. To the same effect, Walraven v.
Sprague, Warner & Co.8 9
Upon the basis of decisions of the Supreme Court, a question
which does not call for a speculative or conjectural answer may prop-
80216 Wis. 631 (1935).
81 Supra, note 70.
82 Supra, note 77.
83 216 Wis. 387, 400 (1934).
84 248 Wis. 1 (1945).
85 211 Wis. 326 (1933).
86 253 Wis. 618 (1948).
87 188 Wis. 344, 350 (1925).
88 250 Wis. 242 (1947).
89 235 Wis. 259, 268-269 (1940).
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erly be addressed to a medical expert. Such question need not be in
any stereotyped form. It may call for a medical opinion based upon
a reasonable certainty, or to a reasonable probability. Such question
may also be couched in such form as to permit the physician to testify
that a certain condition is apt to follow or is likely to follow or is liable
to follow.
VI
How FAR DOES THE PRIVILEGE OF A PHYSICIAN EXTEND
AND How MAY A PARTY COMPEL 1RODUCTION AD
INSPECTION OF NON-PRIVILEGED MATTERS
Section 325.21 of the Statutes provides for a privilege of physicians
or surgeons not to disclose any information acquired in attending a
patient in a professional character necessary to enable him profes-
sionally to serve the patient. There are four exceptions, none of which
apply to the ordinary personal injury except that the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased or disabled plaintiff and the plaintiff himself
in a personal injury action may waive the privilege.
The rigor of the original statute has been softened by a number
of amendments over the years. Such amendments make some of the
earlier cases involving the privilege obsolete.
The present attitude of the Supreme Court towards the privilege
is expressed in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Kozlowski,90 where the
court said:
"The reason of the rule of the statute, as far as it has any, is
that patients may be afflicted with disease or have vicious or
uncleanly habits necessary for a physician to know in order to
treat them properly, disclosure of which would subject them to
humiliation, shame, or disgrace, and which they might refrain
from disclosing to a physician if the physician could be com-
pelled to disclose them on the witness stand. Boyle v. North-
western Mutual Relief Asso. 95 Wis. 312, 70 N.W. 351. If the
disclosures to the physician be such as not to subject the patient
to shame or affect his reputation or social standing, there is no
reason why a physician should not disclose them, and sound
reason why in the interest of truth and justice he should be
compelled to disclose them. The physician's exemption from
disclosure should in reason be limited to such disclosures as
would injure the patient's feelings or reputation. The statute
too often works, as stated by Justice Owen in his dissenting
opinion in Maine v. Maryland C. Co. 172 Wis. 350, 359, 178
N.W. 749, 'to cheat rather than to promote justice and to sup-
press rather than reveal truth.' "
In Leusink v. O'Donnell,"" the court held that hospital records,
90226 Wis. 641, 644 (1938).
91255 Wis. 627, 632 (1949).
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nurses records and reports, the testimony of the x-ray operator em-
ployed by the hospital and the x-ray plate made by the operator at
the direction of the attending physician were not privileged. The
decision represents the weight of authority. 92
In Kirkpatrick v. Milks,93 the court held that the testimony of an
attending physician relating to acts and admissions of the patient not
necessary to enable him to discharge his professional relation to the
patient, were not privileged.
In Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,94 the court held
that Section 325.21 did not bar the testimony of an intern, a nurse or
attendant because they were not physicians within the meaning of the
statute.
The statutes provide a method for inspection of non-privileged
documents, and for a physical examination of the injured party.
Section 269.57 confers upon trial courts in their discretion the power
to order an inspection of medical documentary proof, and to order the
injured party :o submit to a physical examination. Although the
langauge in the statute is permissive and not mandatory, the court
in Leusink v. O'Donnell,95 held in effect that the statute was mandatory
and not permissive. The decision is in line with the universal practice
of trial courts to require an inspection of medical documentary proof
and to compel the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination. In
that case, it appeared that hospitals, including the Veterans Hospital
at Wood, Wisconsin, had custody of the documentary proof. The
court therefore ordered the injured party to sign a written consent to
the examination of the records.
Section 269.57 of the Statutes confers upon the court the power to
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which a party may require
the production of documentary proof or inspection, and to compel
the injured party to submit to a physical examination. It has become
quite a general practice for the courts to require a copy of the report
of the examining physician to be furnished to the injured party or
to his attorney.
It should be noted in passing that when the injured party puts
a medical witness on the witness stand, the privilege conferred by
Section 325.21 no longer exists.
96
92 Weiss v. Weiss, 147 Oh. St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245, 169 A.L.R. 678 (1947) and anno.
following the decision.
93257 Wis. 549, 552 (1950).
0 191 Wis. 239. 242 (1926).
95 Supra, note 91, at 633.96 Cretney v. Woodmen Accident Co., 196 Wis. 29, 35-36 (1928), 62 A.L.R. 675,
and Annotation p. 680: 1945 WiscoNsiN LAW REVIEW, 409, 413. The case of
Cohodes v. M.&M.L.&T.Co., 149 Wis. 308, 313 (1912) to the contrary, has been




How ARE HoSPITAL RECORDS KEPT AND How
MAY THEY BE USED
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 9 7 through
its Board of Commissioners, has proposed a revision of The Standards
for Hospitals Accreditation throughout the United States and Canada,
which it is expected will be approved in January, 1956.
Subdivision I C of the Standards for Hospital Accreditation spe-
cifies the standards for methods of procedure. Essential services
which the hospital must maintain include the following:
"J. ***
"2. Medical Record Department
a. Administrative Responsibilities
1) There shall be a medical record maintained on every
patient admitted for care in the hospital.
2) Records shall be kept inviolate and preserved for a
period of time not less than that determined by the
Statute of Limitations in the respective state.
3) Qualified personnel adequate to supervise and conduct
the department shall be provided.
4) A system of identification and filing to insure the
rapid location of a patient's medical record shall be
maintained. The unit number system is suggested;
however, a serial number system or modification of
this is acceptable.
5) Records should be indexed according to disease,
operation, and physician and should be kept up-to-
date.
6) All clinical information pertaining to a patient should
be centralized in the patient's record.
7) The Standard Nomenclature is preferred if medical
records are coded.
b. Medical Staff Responsibilities
1) The medical record must contain sufficient inform-
ation to justify the diagnosis and warrant the treat-
ment and end results.
2) Only physicians or house staff are competent to write
or dictate medical histories and physical examina-
tions.
97The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is a non-profit organiza-
tion which is financed by the American College of Physicians, the American
College of Surgeons, the American Hospital Association, the American Medi-
cal Association, and the Canadian Medical Association. The Joint Commission
was organized in the Fall of 1951. It took over accreditation of hospitals
which the American College of Surgeons had formerly conducted on the basis
of a national program. The Commission has a board of twenty members all
of whom, with the exception of two, are doctors. The Treasurer is Mr. S. m.
Hummel, who is the Administrator of Columbia Hospital in Milwaukee. The
object of the program carried on by the Joint Commission is to elevate the
standards of treatment of hospital patients.
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3) Current records and those on discharged patients
should be completed promptly.
4) Records must be authenticated and signed by the
physician.









8) Clinical laboratory reports
9) X-ray reports
10) Provisional diagnosis
11) Tissue report: Gross
Microscopic








1) A clinical laboratory adequate for the individual hos-
pital must be maintained in the hospital.
2) Provision shall be made to carry out chemical, bac-
teriological, and serological examinations.
3) Facilities should be available at all times.
4) Personnel adequate to supervise and conduct the
service should be provided.
5) Urinalysis and at least a hemoglobin or hematocrit
should be routine examinations on all admissions.
6) Signed reports should be filed with the patient's
record and duplicate copies kept in the department.
b. Pathological
1) The services of a pathologist must be provided as
indicated by the needs of the hospital.
2) All tissues removed at operation should be sent for
examination. The extent of the examination should
be determined by the pathology department.
3) Signed reports of tissue examinations should be filed
with the patient's record and duplicate copies kept
in the department.
4) Tissue reports should be indexed according to patho-
logic diagnosis.
c. Blood Bank
Facilities for procurement and safe-keeping of blood




a. The hospital must maintain radiological services accord-
ing to the needs of the hospital.
b. The radiology department shall be free of hazards for
patients and personnel.
c. The interpretation of radiological examinations shall be
made by physicians competent in the field.
d. Signed reports should be filed with the patient's record
and duplicate copies kept in the department.
e. Reports should be indexed according to radiological diag-
nosis.
"6. * * *
Subdivision I D provides that the following services may be main-
tained:
"1. ***
"2. Emergency Service. If a service is maintained:
a. There shall be a well organized department directed by
qualified personnel and integrated with other departments
of the hospital.
b. Facilities shall be provided to assure prompt diagnosis
and emergency treatment.
c. There shall be adequate medical and nursing personnel
available at all times.
d. Adequate medical records on every patient must be kept.
e. * * *
Subdivision II A provides for a medical staff and outlines the
responsibilities. Such responsibilities of the medical staff are in part
as follows:
*J.
"2. * * *
"3.**
"4. Maintenance of adequate medical records.
"5. Holding of necessary consultations. Except in emergency,
consultation with another qualified physician shall be re-
quired in all first Caesarean sections and in all curettages
or other procedures by which a known or suspected preg-
nancy may be interrupted. The same requirement shall
apply to operations performed for the sole purpose of
sterilization on both male and female patients. Included
in consultations required under this Standard are all those
which are required under the rules of the hospital staff. In
major surgical cases in which the patient is not a good risk.
and in all cases in which the diagnosis is obscure, or when
there is doubt as to the best therapeutic measures to be uti-
lized, consultation is appropriate. Obviously, judgment as
to the scious nature of the illness and the question of doubt
as to diagnosis and treatment rests with the physician re-
sponsible for the care if the patient. It is the duty of the
hospital staff through its chiefs of service and Executive
1956]
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Committee to see that members of the staff do not fail in the
matter of calling consultants as needed: A consultant must
be well qualified to give an opinion in the field in which his
opinion is sought. A satisfactory consultation includes ex-
amination of the patient and the record and a written opinion
signed by the consultant which is made part of the record.
When operative procedures are involved, the consultation
note, except in emergency, shall be recorded prior to oper-
ation."
Subdivision II C outlines the organization of the staff and pro-
vides for the following Committees:
"3. Committees
a. Executive Committee
b. Qualifications or Credentials Committee
c. Joint Conference Committee
d. Medical Records Committee
The Medical Records Committee shall supervise and
appraise the quality of medical records, and shall insure
their maintenance at the required standard. The Com-
mittee shall meet at least once a month and submit to the
Executive Committee a report in writing which will be
made a part of the permanent record.
e. Tissue Committee
Subdivision II E provides for departments which may be main-
tained, as follows:
"1. Anesthesia
The organization of the Department of Anesthesia shall be
comparable to that of the other services of the medical staff.
In addition, there shall be required in every case:
a. Preanesthetic physical examination with findings re-
corded;
b. Anesthetic record on special form;
c. Postanesthetic examination, with findings recorded.
"2. ***





Medical records shall be maintained and correlated with
other hospital medical records."
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Subdivision III provides for a nursing department. All hospitals
must meet the following requirements for accreditation:
"1* * *
C. Records
Adequate records shall be maintained.
The medical records which must now be kept by an accredited
hospital do not differ greatly from those presently used by the larger
hospitals in Milwaukee. These records present individual problems
when an attempt is made to introduce them into evidence. The trial
court can simplify many of these problems if it permits portions of
the hospital records to be introduced into evidence with the under-
standing that the records shall not be sent to the jury room. Counsel
may then read to the jury such parts only of the records as the court
admits into evidence. If this plan is not followed, the greater portions
of the records cannot be received in evidence for the reasons which I
will later develop. For example, under identification data, the question
is asked whether the patient is white or colored. The question is also
asked about the religion of the patient. I need not labor the point
that these matters should not be brought to the attention of the jury.
The records contain the complaints of the patients. These complaints
may or may not be relevant depending upon the person who pre-
pares the record. If an intern prepares the record, the description of
the complaints will be based largely upon his ingenuity and imagina-
tion. The same situation obtains with respect to present illness, past
history and family history. Many details which are clearly irrelevant
and some of which may be embarrassing and degrading to a patient
appear under these headings.
Most of the hospital records in the City of Milwaukee contain
a provisional diagnosis usually labeled "impressions." Because of the
flexibility of the title used, it is obvious that many of these "impres-
sions" have no relevancy.
From an evidentiary standpoint, hospital records present two legal
problems: First whether they are admissible in evidence, and if so,
what foundation must be laid for their admission, and, secondly, to
what use may the records be put by a physician.
28 U.S.C.A., Section 1732, which was formerly Section 69, the
so-called FEDERAL SHOP REcoRDs ACT, contains provisions similar
to those contained in Section 327.25 of the WISCONSIN STATUTES.
The Congress included in the statute a provision that the term "busi-




In Medina v. Erickson,98 the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit held that two consultation reports made by doctors who
had examined the plaintiff, and which formed a part of the hospital
record of the plaintiff were admissible in evidence. The reports were
made in accordance with the regulations of the hospital, which was a
member of the American Hospital Association. The regulations re-
quired consultation reports to be made on a standard form at or about
the time of the examination and filed as a part of the regular hospital
records of a patient. Apparently the consultation form was similar
to that which has been prescribed by the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals. The reports were made at the request of the
attending physician. The Court of Appeals pointed out that there was
nothing to indicate that the reports were made for the purpose of
"litigating," page 482, and that having met the test of Section 1732,
the reports were admissible, even though they contained hearsay, and
denied to the representative of the deceased patient the right of cross-
examination.
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,99 the court held that
under the decision in Palmer v. Hoffman, °00 only parts of the hospital
records could be introduced as records. The court stated that the test
of admissibility was whether the records related to a readily observable
condition of the patient or of his treatment. The court further held
that the admissibility of records containing a diagnosis must depend
upon their character.
In Schaffer v. Seas Shipping Co.,1°9 the court admitted a hospital
record which contained the plaintiff's "history of present illness." The
history read as follows: "PT. is a 27 yr. old Wh. A.S., fell on 24 April,
1951, & injured rt shoulder. Pt. was scuffling at the time-& fell back
striking his Rt. joint(?) shoulders . . . "The trial court rejected
the history but the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was ad-
missible.
In Masterson v. Penn R. Co.,102 the court held that for medical
records to be admissible in evidence, it must first be shown that the
writing was made by or under the direction of the physician at or near
the time of his examination of the patient, and that it was his custom, in
the regular course of his professional practice, to make such a record
(page 797).
The FEDERAL BUSINEss REcoRDs Acr is not, of course, binding
upon the courts of the State of Wisconsin. It must be considered,
however, in view of three decisions of our Supreme Court. In Beilke
98 226 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1955).
99147 F.2d 297 (C.A.D.C. 1945).
100 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
101 218 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir. 1955).
1o2 782 F.2d 793 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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v. Knaack,1'0 the defendants contended that the trial court erred in
admitting over objection daily hospital records relating to the con-
dition of the plaintiff and the treatment given to him. The sisters, who
nursed the plaintiff and who in a large part kept the daily records were
not produced upon the trial. No attempt was made to show that the
sisters were beyond the jurisdiction of the court or insane as provided
by Section 327.25 of the Statutes. The court held that the admission
of the record was error but not prejudicial. The trial court admitted
the records as a part of the testimony of the attending physician. The
physician testified that from his observation the records were correct;
that they were the records kept in the hospital and were kept under
his direction; that he observed them twice every day and knew the
records to be correct as far as they went. This is the only case I
have been able to find directly passing upon the admissibility of hos-
pital records in Wisconsin. Although the court there held the records
to be inadmissible, it may reasonably be inferred that if the custodian
of the hospital records had testified to a proper foundation, the records
would have been admissible.
Some trial courts have permitted the introduction of hospital
records as business records. In a case which I tried a couple of years
ago, Judge Drechsler refused to permit the hospital records to be
introduced in toto as business records.
The second case which indirectly involved the FEDERAL BUSINESS
RECORDS ACT is Stella Cheese Co. v. C. St. P. M. & 0. R. Co.10 4 In
that case, Justice Fowler, speaking for the court, held that Section
327.25 of the Statutes is in substantial accord with the Federal Act.
There is a scholarly discussion of the broad subject of admissibility
of business records at pages 200 and 202. Justice Fowler speaks of
the problems for reform of the law of evidence suggested by Edmund
M. Morgan of Harvard University, Edson R. Sutherland, and Pro-
fessor Wigmore. Since the Federal Act applies in express language
to professions, and since the court has held that Section 327.25 is
substantially in accord with the Federal Act, the decisions in the
Federal courts interpreting the Federal Act, while not controlling,
should be studied in connection with the question of the admissibility
of hospital records.
There is an interesting discussion of the scope of the decision in
the Stella'0 5 case in 1947 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 96, 100, A Code
on Evidence for Wisconsin by Philachek & Spohn.
Perhaps the most enlightening statement in connection with hos-
pital records, although the admissibility of hospital records was not
103 207 Wis. 490, 495 (1932).




squarely presented, is found in Sundquist v. Madison Railways Co.1 6
There, Justice Stevens, whose judicial training consisted principally
in many years of service as trial judge, speaking for the court said:
"(3) But it is urged that the testimony of the doctor who
treated the plaintiff in Washington was not admissible because
the doctor testified that he made his diagnosis of hysterical
paralysis by the exclusion of other possible causes for plaintiff's
condition, and that in so doing he relied upon the report of the
result of examinations made by hospital technicians, such as are
regularly made in modern hospitals, as well as upon the history
of the case and what he found upon his examination of the
plaintiff. Those who made these tests were not called to show
how the tests were made or that the results of these tests were
correctly recorded in these reports. The reports of these techni-
cians were not received in evidence. Their contents were not
disclosed to the jury.
"In order to say that a physician, who has actually used the
result of those tests in a diagnosis and in the treatment of the
plaintiff, may not testify what that diagnosis was, the court
must deliberately shut its eyes to a source of information which
is relied on by mankind generally in matters that involve the
health and may involve the life of their families and of them-
selves,-a source of information that it is essential the court
should possess in order that it may do justice between these
parties litigant.
"In making a diagnosis for treatment physicians must of neces-
sity consider many things that do not appear in sworn proof on
the trial of a lawsuit,-things that mean much to the trained
eye and touch of a skilled medical practitioner. This court has
held that it will not close the doors of the courts to the light
which is given by a diagnosis which all the rest of the world
accepts and acts upon, even if the diagnosis is in part based
upon facts which are not established by the sworn testimony
in the case to be true. Leora v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co.,
156 Wis. 386, 395, 146 N.W. 520."
The weight of authority outside Wisconsin is contrary to the
Sundquist"'7 decision. Three decisions, each well reasoned, support
the Sundquist' case: U.S. v. Katz,10 9 National Bank of Commerce
v. City of New Bedford,"0 Standard Oil Co. v. Sewell."' Justice
Stevens was indeed farsighted when he wrote the decision in the
Sundquist case. There is absolutely no reason why the reports of
technicians on the interpretation of X-rays and on laboratory tests
should not be admissible in evidence as a part of the hospital records
without calling the individuals who made the various tests. A proper
106 197 Wis. 83, 86-87 (1928).
107 Ibid. See Anno. 175 Wis. 274, 286.
108 Ibid.
109 213 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1954).
110 175 Mass. 257, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900), (opinion by Chief Justice Holmes).
1 37 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1930).
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foundation must be laid by showing through the attending physician
that he relied upon the reports in making his diagnosis and in pre-
scribing treatment for the patient. I realize that there may be excep-
tions to the general rule where the trial court will deem it necessary
to call the persons who made the tests to lay a proper foundation. For
example, there may be a question about the correctness of the inter-
pretation of an X-ray plate. In my own experience, on one occasion,
an orthopedlt specialist testified to the possibility of a fracture line in
a bone as disclosed in the X-ray. It later developed that there was a
defect in the film and that there was in fact no fracture. But in an
ordinary case, the fact that the attending physician relies on the report
is a sufficient guarantee of its correctness.
In MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, page 609-610, the author points out
that modern hospital records are at least as trustworthy, if not more
so, than business records, when he said:
"The safeguards of trustworthiness, however, of the records
of a modem hospital are at least as substantial as the guarantees
of reliability of the records of business establishments. With
the progress in the science and skills of medicine and surgery
goes a corresponding improvement and standardization of the
practice of recording the facts about the patient-facts upon
which the treatment of the patient, and hence his health and
even his life, may depend. The scope of such records is shown
by the Manual of Hospital Standardization of the American
College of Surgeons.
"In the light of these developments, most courts would con-
cede today that hospital records will be received upon the same
conditions of meeting the requirements of regularity, present
knowledge, contemporaneousness, production of participants
and the like, as are prescribed for business records."
The final diagnosis of the physician contained in the hospital
records should not be received in evidence simply as a part of the
hospital record. The decision in New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Taylor,1 1 2 correctly holds that the diagnosis is a matter which should
come into the case only through the testimony of the physician who
made the diagnosis.
One of the most troublesome problems encountered with hospital
records relates to the history. In many cases, such history is taken
by the intern. Where the patient is unconscious, although the history
usually bears the date of the admission of the patient, the history
is obtained after the patient becomes conscious, or is obtained from
relatives, friends, witnesses or officers. Such history, if admissible at
all, should only be admitted through the testimony of the intern who
wrote the history. A corresponding situation exists with reference to
'12 147 F.2d 297 (C.A.D.C. 1945).
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the "impressions" of the intern who in some cases is not a licensed
physician.
There are a few cases holding that the "impressions" of an intern
may be received as a part of the hospital records without producing
the intern as a witness. In Reed v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers,"" the intern wrote "well under the influence of alcohol."
The history was held admissible. In Ulm v. Moore-McCormick Lines,
Inc.,"' the intern stated that on admission the patient did not appear
to be acutely ill. The court held the statement admissible. In D'Amato
v. Johnston,"5 the hospital records contained an entry by an intern
and a roentgenologist that the patient was intoxicated. The court held
the record admissible. The court in Cowan v. McDonel,1' 6 adhered
to the same rule and permitted the impression of the intern that there
was an odor of alcohol on the patient to be introduced in evidence.
I suggest that in all of these cases, the evidence with reference to
the condition of the patient should be admitted only through the
intern if admissible at all, and not as a part of the hospital records.
That part of the history relating to the accident itself and the
manner in which the plaintiff received his injuries should not be
admitted in evidence as a hospital record. I have pointed out earlier
that such history cannot be admitted as substantive evidence as a part
of the testimony of an attending physician. For a stronger reason,
such history should not be admitted as a part of the hospital records.
The most recent case on the subject is Williams v. Alexander.17
In that case, the injured plaintiff sought to keep a hospital record out
of evidence, although he had introduced that part of the record which
bore upon his injuries and treatment. The record contained a state-
ment allegedly made by the plaintiff to his attending physician that
he sustained an injury when an automobile ran into the defendant's
automobile causing it to strike the plaintiff. The evidence was offered
in support of the defendant's contention that he was at a standstill
waiting for the plaintiff to cross the intersection. The court, speaking
through Fuld, J., said that a memorandum made in a hospital record
of acts or occurrences leading to the patient's hospitalization, such as
a narration of the accident causing the injury, was not germane to
diagnosis and treatment and was therefore not admissible under the
BUSINEss REcoRDs ACT. The trial court admitted the evidence. Be-
cause of the error in such admission, the judgment of the trial court
was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Three of the
judges dissented.
13 123 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1941).
114 117 F.2d 222 (2nd Cir. 1941).
115 140 Conn. 54, 97 A.2d 893 (1953).
116330 Mass. 148, 111 N.E.2d 759 (1953).
21 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
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In Brown v. St. Paul City R. Co.;11 the hospital record received
in evidence stated that the plaintiff while boarding a streetcar on
the 16th of May, 1950, was thrown from the step when the door was
closed suddenly in her face; that she was thrown to the street and
rolled to the curb; that she was taken to a store and then brought
to the hospital. The \court held that statements made by an injured
,person as to the cause of the injury and the circumstances attending
the accident made to a physician so long afterwards as not to be part
of the res gestae, were admissible- The court said, page 547 of
44 A.L.R. 2d:
"We believe the better rule is that . . . hospital records and
charts, properly identified, are admissible when not privileged
to prove diagnosis, treatment, or medical history of the patient
pertinent to the medical and surgical aspects of the case but that
hearsay and self-serving statements contained therein are not
admissible to prove how an injury occurred . . ."
There is an interesting discussion on limitations of use of hospital
records in INSURANCE COUNSEL JOURNAL Vol. XV P. 73 "Hospital
Records in Evidence" by Raymond Icallen.
In the extensive annotation commencing at page 553 of 44 A.L.R.
2d the author cites and analyzes many cases involving the admission
of portions of hospital records relating to the details of an accident.
These cases almost uniformly hold that such narrative statements are
not admissible as a part of the hospital records.
I have suggested that in no event should hospital records be sent
to the jury room. One illustration, I think, will prove that the records
will not assist the jury in reaching a verdict. I shall never forget a
case which I tried many years ago where the doctor testified about
the treatment he gave to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's lawyer, who
was one of the leading trial lawyers in the state, had the plaintiff's
doctor testify in detail about his treatment of the plaintiff. Time aftdr
time, the doctor testified that he treated the patient by prescribing
acetylsalicylic acid. When the doctor testified, I hadJ no idea what the
substance was that the doctor talked about. Fortunately, I had an
opportunity at recess before cross-examination to find out the defini-
nition of the term. To my amazement, I found that the word which
the doctor used was the technical name for one of the commonest
remedies known to everybody who has ever had a cold-aspirin. This
is simply one illustration of the language found in hospital records.
If the trial court will, at the next trial of a personal injury action, look
at the hospital record it will find many technical words, even in the
nurses progress notes, which require the use of a dictionary to define.
I1s 62 N.W.2d 688, 44 A.L.R. 2d 535 (Minn. 1954).
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Even the diagnosis as it appears in most records is couched in mystical
lan, age as far as a layman is concerned. Patently, such records
cannot assist the jury in arriving at a verdict.
VIII
To WHAT EXTENT MAY DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE BE USED
It has been held since an early day that X-rays are admissible in
evidence. Mauch v. City of Hartford."9
In Dabareiner v. Weisflog,120 the court permitted the plaintiff to
introduce into evidence charts of the human pelvis. The court ordered
the charts to be sent to the jury room. The Supreme Court held that
the necessity for the introduction of such exhibits was a matter resting
within the sound discretion of the trial court (page 31).
We suggest that the introduction of such exhibits in evidence and
especially the practice of permitting such evidence to go to the jury
should seldom happen, and then only in selected cases. Such charts
contain pictures of various anatomical structures identified and de-
scribed by technical words and phrases wholly unintelligible to the
average lay person.
The courts have permitted the display before the jury of various
parts of the body of an injured party. Thus, a woman was permitted
to display her foot and ankle to the jury. Jansen v. Herkert.12 1 The
trial court permitted the display so as to afford to the doctor an op-
portunity to indicate the extent of the injuries of the plaintiff.
In Pargeter v. C.&N.W. R. Co., 122 and Hiller v. Johnson,123 the
injured plaintiffs were permitted to move their arms up and down to
demonstrate to the jury crepitation in such movements.
The court permitted the plaintiff, who was a boy, to show residuals
of dog bites to the jury. The court held that the exhibiting of the
injured portion of the boy's body was within the trial court's discre-
tion. Tatreau v. Buecher.12 4
In a case which I tried sometime ago, and which went up to the
Supreme Court on a point not here involved, Judge O'Neill properly
permitted the plaintiff, a young man about 23 years of age, to roll his
trousers above his knees to show an all-male jury the extent of burns
on his legs and to show the location of donor sites on his thighs from
which skin had been taken for skin grafts made below his knees. The
Judge, however, refused to permit colored photographs of the injured
legs to be introduced in evidence.
119 112 Wis. 40 (1901).
120 253 Wis. 23 (1948).
121249 Wis. 124, 132-133 (1945).122264 Wis. 250 (1953).
124 162 Wis. 19 (1916).124 256 Wis. 252 (1949).
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The question of the use of medical photographs has been the sub-
ject of a great deal of discussion recently. One of the articles which
contains an extensive bibliography is found in the NEW YORK STATE
BAR BULLETIN for December, 1954. It is entitled "Medical Photo-
graphs as an Aid to Trial Lawyers." The author is Albert Averbach
of the New York Bar. The extent to which such photographs may
be used under the current decisions of appellate courts rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court. Govier v. Brechler;-2 5 SCOTT
PHOTOGRAPHIc EVIDENCE, page 473 et seq. I suggest, however, that
in the ordinary case photographs are not necessary to establish the
plaintiff's case. There will be, of course, exceptions where a physician
has difficulty in describing the condition without the use of photo-
graphs. It is conceivable that cases may arise where a series of photo-
graphs or moving pictures might be required to enable a physician to
demonstrate the extent of injuries and the surgical methods which
he used to correct the injuries. This is particularly true in the field
of plastic surgery. Plastic surgeons generally have adopted the practice
of taking "before" and "after" photographs and sometimes take photo-
graphs during the progress of their treatment. I recently tried a case
before Judge Shaughnessy who properly permitted the introduction
in evidence of photographs of a woman plaintiff who had sustained
serious lacerations to her face when her head struck the windshield.
Perhaps this part of the discussion can best be summarized by
stating that the trial court should admit demonstrative evidence in the
exercise of a sound discretion, and that in case of doubt, or in case
there is a danger of exciting undue emotion, the evidence should be
excluded.
Ix
WHAT MEDICAL PROOF Is NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT
FOR FUTURE MEDICAL ATTENTION, FUTURE PERMANENT
DISABILITY AND FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING?
Only a medical expert can testify as to required medical cure.
Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Industrial Commission. 26
Only a medical expert can testify to permanency of injuries and
future pain and suffering. Diemel v. Weirich.1 2 7
In view of these decisions, the court cannot sustain a verdict of
the jury based upon permanent injuries and inability to carry on a
vocation with a consequent wage loss unless there is medical testimony
which supports a finding of permanent injury. The same situation
obtains with respect to future pain and suffering. Unless there is
125 159 Wis. 157 (1914).
126263 Wis. 380 (1953).
127264 Wis. 265 (1953).
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competent medical testimony substantiating future pain and suffering,
it is error to submit such a question to the jury.
X
Is LAY TESTIMONY AS TO PAIN AND SUFFERING AND THE CONDITION
OF THE HEALTH OF AN INJURED PERSON ADMISSIBLE?
Trial courts must continually pass upon the admissibility of testi-
mony of lay persons concerning pain and suffering and physical condi-
tion of an injured party. In Ready v. Hafeman,1 12 the court laid down
the following rule: "Witnesses are not permitted to testify to com-
plaints or statements of physical condition or feelings made by an in-
jured person which were made in answer to a question or which are
narrative in their nature and which are not a part of the res gestae."
In the early case of Keller v. Gilman,1 29 the court attempted to
set forth some general rules affecting the admissibility of lay testimony.
The court there held that any person may testify as to facts within his
observation concerning the physical condition of another, e.g., whether
a person appeared to be in good or bad health, sick or well, suffering
from pain or disease, or enjoying life. In that connection, the court
held that a lay witness was competent to testify to the apparent physical
ability of the plaintiff to do lifting and to perform her household
duties. With respect to bodily pain, the court held that all persons
may testify as to expressions, gestures, or exclamations indicating
present pain, whether made at the time of the injury, or afterwards.
The court, however, held that lay witnesses could not testify to com-
plaints or statements of physical conditions or feelings made by an
injured person in response to a question or which were narrative ti
their nature.
In Bredlau v. York,"30 the court permitted the plaintiff's daughter
to testify as to expressions of pain uttered by her mother three days
after the accident and that her mother appeared to be in pain.
It is for the court to determine whether the statements made by
lay witnesses are narrative in their nature and therefore inadmis-
sible. 131
A physician may testify as a lay witness to acts, conditions and
observations of a person.'
3 2
CONCLUSION
This is a scientific age. Just as the advances in medical science and
128239 Wis. 1, 10 (1941).
12993 Wis. 9 (1896).
130 115 Wis. 554, 557 (1902).
131 Ready v. Hafeman, 239 Wis. 1, 10 (1941); Kressin v. C.&N.W.R. Co., 194 Wis.
480, 486 (1928).
132 Will of Williams, 256 Wis. 338, 351-352 (1949).
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the keeping of hospital records has occasioned this paper today, so
will the effect of the atom and hydogen bombs and other scientific
advancements call for additional papers tomorrow. The law must
keep pace with the sciences. There must be a scientific method in the
law as Urban A. Lavery, the former managing editor of the AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL so brilliantly stated in "Scientific Method
in the Law-Its Uses and Limitations," 18 F.R.D. 123. There never
can be certainty in law. If that time ever comes, the law will cease to
serve a useful function as Judge Jerome Frank pointed out in "Law
and the Modern Mind," pages 11-12. We must put to ourselves this
question: Of what advantage is the modern scientific age if the law
is unable to devise methods to utilize such scientific achievements in
court?
I commenced this paper with a problem suggested by Judge Laws.
I shall close by leaving you his solution:
"It has been my observation that no matter how many fine pro-
cedures there are, no matter how many fine rulings are written,
the matter of disposition of business always requires effective
personnel in order to accomplish it. We must have able lawyers.
And if you tell me we must have able judges, I will agree with
you. In order to move these trials we must have men who know
how to try cases. We must have men who know how to intro-
duce evidence in court, how to separate the wheat from the
chaff, how to prevent the spread into collateral issues, how to
stop an ambitious person from making a career out of a case,
and finally how to stop men from over-trying cases. We need
an enlightened and able bench and bar. When gigantic prob-
lems face the man of medicine, he does not entrust the opera-
tion to the interne, the general practitioner, or the diagnosti-
cian; he turns it over to the skilled hand of the surgeon."
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